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Electoral Cyber Interference, Self-Determination and The Principle of Non-
Intervention in Cyberspace  
 
Nicholas Tsagourias* 
 
 [forthcoming in Dennis Broeders and Bibi van den Berg, Governing Cyberspace: Behaviour, 
Power and Diplomacy, Rowman & Littlefield, 2020] 
Abstract  
This chapter examines the application of the principle of non-intervention to electoral cyber 
interference. In the first place, it discusses how the traditional definition of intervention can 
apply to such interference and identifies the normative and regulatory gaps that arise. For 
this reason, it proceeds to contextualise and reconceptualise the meaning of intervention in 
cyberspace and then applies this new definition to electoral cyber interference such as the 
interference in the 2016 US elections. Its main argument is that the baseline of intervention is 
control over choices whereas the function of the principle of non-intervention is to protect the 
principle of self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQLQWHUSUHWHGDVWKHIUHHFRQVWUXFWLRQRID6WDWH¶VDXWKRULW\DQG
will. Thus, external cyber interference amounting to control over the cognitive environment 
within which such authority and will are formed violates the principle of non-intervention.  
I. Introduction 
It is by now accepted that International law applies to cyberspace. The 2013 Report of the 
United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information 
and telecommunications in the context of international security (GGE) affirmed that 
international law, especially the UN Charter, applies to cyberspace and that State sovereignty 
and international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty apply to State conduct of 
ICT-UHODWHG DFWLYLWLHVDQG WR MXULVGLFWLRQRYHU ,&7 LQIUDVWUXFWXUHZLWKLQD6WDWH¶V WHUULWRU\1 
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The 2015 GGE Report went a step further by spelling out specific international norms and 
principles that apply, or should apply, to cyberspace. Among the international law principles 
that apply to cyberspace are the principle of State sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other States. 2 In the same vein, States have affirmed the 
application of international law and of the principle of non-intervention to cyberspace. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR&KLQD µ>F@RXQWULHVVKRXOGQ¶WXVH,&7V WRLQWHUIHUH LQRWKHUFRXQWULHV¶ LQWHUQDO
DIIDLUV DQG XQGHUPLQH RWKHU FRXQWULHV¶ SROLWLFDO HFRQRPLF DQG VRFLDO VWDELOLW\ DV ZHOO DV
FXOWXUDOHQYLURQPHQW¶3 
 
Notwithstanding such strong assertions, how international law or, more specifically, 
how the principle of non-intervention applies to cyberspace and to cyber operations is beset 
by uncertainty. According to the former Legal Advisor to the State Department, Brian Egan, 
µ6WDWHVQHHGWRGRPRUHZRUNWRFODULI\KRZWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZRQQRQ-intervention applies 
WR6WDWHV¶DFWLYLWLHV LQ F\EHUVSDFH¶4 This state of affairs came to a head with regard to the 
5XVVLDQF\EHULQWHUIHUHQFHLQWKH86SUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQ5XVVLD¶VWRRONLWRIHOHFWRUDO
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1
 U.N. General Assembly, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, 24 June 2013, 
68th sess., U.N. Doc. A/68/98, paras. 19-20. 
2
 U.N. General Assembly, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, 22 July 2015, 
17th sess., U.N. Doc. A/70/174, para 26. 
3
 P. R. C., Permanent Mission to the U.N., Statement by Ms. Liu Ying of the Chinese 
Delegation at the Thematic Debate on Information and Cyber Security at the First Committee 
of the 68th Session of the UNGA, 30 October 2013, www.china-
un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1094491.htm. 
4
 Brian J. Egan ³,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ DQG 6WDELOLW\ LQ &\EHUVSDFH´ %HUNHOH\ - ,QW¶O / 35 
,QWKHVDPHYHLQWKH8.$WWRUQH\*HQHUDOVDLGµ7he precise boundaries 
of this principle are the subject of ongoing debate between states, and not just in the context 
RI F\EHU VSDFH¶ U..$WWRUQH\*HQHUDO¶V2IILFHCyber and International Law in the 21st 
Century, 23 May 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-
law-in-the-21st-century.  
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LQWHUIHUHQFHFRQVLVWHGRIGLVLQIRUPDWLRQDQG µKDFNDQG OHDN¶RSHUDWLRQV5 Views concerning 
WKH OHJDO FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQ RI5XVVLD¶V DFWLRQV YDU\ and although commentators invoked the 
principle of non-intervention WKHPDMRULW\ FRQFOXGHG WKDW5XVVLD¶V DFWLRQVGLGQRW IXOILO LWV
conditions in particular that of coercion.6 The US incident is not the only example of electoral 
cyber interference; other incidents involve elections in the Netherlands, the UK, France and 
Germany to name just a few.7 Although electoral interference is not a new phenomenon, 
                                                          
5
 862IILFH RI WKH'LUHFWRU RI1DWLRQDO ,QWHOOLJHQFH ³%DFNJURXQG WR µ$VVHVVLQJ5XVVLDQ
$FWLYLWLHVDQG,QWHQWLRQVLQ5HFHQW86(OHFWLRQV¶7KH$QDO\WLF3URFHVVDQG&\EHU,QFLGHQW
$WWULEXWLRQ¶ LQ ICA, ³$VVHVVLQJ 5XVVLDQ $FWLYLWLHV DQG ,QWHQWLRQV LQ 5HFHQW 86 (OHFWLRQV´ 
(ICA 2017-01, 6 January 2017), p.1 (herein after referred to as ODNI Report, 2017), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf; (8YV'LVLQIR³Methods of Foreign 
(OHFWRUDO ,QWHUIHUHQFH´  $SULO  https://euvsdisinfo.eu/methods-of-foreign-electoral-
interference/.   
6
 Sean Watts, ³,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ DQG 3URSRVHG 86 5HVSRQVHV WR WKH '1& +DFN´, Just 
Security, 14 October 2016, https://www.justsecurity.org/33558/international-law-proposed-u-
s-responses-d-n-c-KDFN'XQFDQ%+ROOLV ³5XVVLD DQG WKH'1&+DFN:KDW)XWXUH IRU D
Duty of NoQ ,QWHUYHQWLRQ"´ Opinio Juris, 25 July 2016, 
http://opiniojuris.org/2016/07/25/russia-and-the-dnc-hack-a-violation-of-the-duty-of-non-
intervention/; -HQV 'DYLG 2KOLQ ³Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election 
9LRODWH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ"´Tex. L. Rev. 95 (2016): 1579. 
7
 Erik Brattberg and Tim MauUHU³5XVVLDQ(OHFWLRQ,QWHUIHUHQFH(XURSH¶V&RXQWHUWR)DNH
1HZV DQG &\EHU $WWDFNV´ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23 May 2018 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/23/russian-election-interference-europe-s-counter-to-
fake-news-and-cyber-attacks-pub-76435;   Laura Galante and Shaun Ee, Atlantic Council, 
6FRZFURIW &HQWHU IRU 6WUDWHJ\ DQG 6HFXULW\ ³'HILQLQJ 5XVVLDQ (OHFWLRQ ,QWHUIHUHQFH $Q
Analysis of Select 2014 to 2018 Cyber Enabled Incidents", September 2018 
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Defining_Russian_Election_Interference
_web.pdf; 6HEDVWLDQ %D\ DQG *XQD âQRUH 1$72 6WUDWHJLF &RPPXQLFDWLRQV &HQWUH RI
ExcelOHQFH ³3URWHFWLQJ HOHFWLRQV D VWUDWHJLF FRPPXQLFDWLRQV DSSURDFK´ -XQH 
https://www.stratcomcoe.org/download/file/fid/80396. For similar activities during the 2018 
elections in Cambodia see: Scott Henderson, Steve Miller, Dan Perez, Marcin Siedlarz, Ben 
Wilson, Ben Read  µ&KLQHVH(VSLRQDJH*URXS7(033HULVFRSH7DUJHWV&DPERGLD$KHDGRI
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cyberspace increases the scalability, reach, and effects of such interference and poses a 
VHULRXVWKUHDWWRD6WDWH¶VVRYHUHLJQDXWKRULW\ 
 
Against this background, this chapter examines the question of how the principle of 
non-intervention can be contextualised and reconceptualised in cyberspace in order to attain 
LWVSXUSRVHRISURWHFWLQJD6WDWH¶VVRYHUHLJQDXWKRULW\LQFDVHVRIHOHFWRUDOF\EHULQWHUIHUHQFH
I will do this by aligning the principle of non-intervention with the principle of self-
determination and by identifying the baseline of intervention and the pathways intervention 
can take in cyberspace. It is hoped that by reassessing the concept of intervention, its 
regulatory scope and effectiveness in cyberspace will be enhanced since cyberspace is linked 
to the political, economic, military, diplomatic, social, and cultural functions of a State and is 
a domain within which, or through which, States operate, interact and exert power.  
  
The chapter proceeds in the following manner. In the next section I explain the 
content and meaning of the principle of non-intervention as traditionally interpreted in 
international law and in the third section I will DSSO\WKLVGHILQLWLRQWR5XVVLD¶VLQWHUIHUHQFHLQ
the 2016 US election. Because of the identified normative and regulatory gaps, in the fourth 
section I expose the relationship between the principle of non-intervention and that of self-
determination, define the baseline of intervention as control and explain the different 
pathways intervention can take in cyberspace. In the fifth section, I apply this concept to 
electoral cyber interference such as the interference in the 2016 US election. The conclusion 
VHWVRXWWKHFKDSWHU¶VRYHUDOOILQGLQJV and explains the importance of reassessing the meaning 
of intervention in the cyber context.  
 
II. The Principle of Non-Intervention 
Non-intervention is a fundamental principle of international law that has acquired customary 
law status even if it is not mentioned in the UN Charter.8 According to the 1965 General 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
July 2018 Elections and ReYHDOV %URDG 2SHUDWLRQV *OREDOO\¶ FireEye, 10 July 2018, 
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/07/chinese-espionage-group-targets-
cambodia-ahead-of-elections.html 
 
8
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 para 202 (hereinafter referred to as Nicaragua Case); 
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Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States 
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty which was repeated almost 
verbatim in the 1970 General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations: µ1R6WDWHKDVWKH
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external 
affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of 
interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, 
economic anG FXOWXUDO HOHPHQWV DUH FRQGHPQHG¶9 In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ defined 
non-LQWHUYHQWLRQ DV µWKH ULJKW RI HYHU\ VRYHUHLJQ 6WDWH WR FRQGXFW LWV >H[WHUQDO RU LQWHUQDO@
DIIDLUVZLWKRXWRXWVLGHLQWHUIHUHQFH¶10  
 
The importance of the principle of non-intervention derives from the fact that it 
emanates from and protects essential aspects of the principle of State sovereignty.11 
Sovereignty as the foundational principle of the modern international system is an all-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
See: Maziar Jamnejad  and Michael Wood, The Principle of Non-Intervention in 
International Law, /HLGHQ-,QW¶O/ 22 (2009): 345, 347±67.  
9
 U.N. General Assembly Res., Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the 
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, 21 
December 1965, U.N. Doc. A/RES/20/2131 (XX), Annex, para 1; U.N. General Assembly 
Res., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation among States in Accordance with the United Nations, 24 October 1970, U. N. 
'RF$5(6 ;;9$QQH[ µ1R6WDWH RU JURXS RI 6WDWHV KDV WKH ULJKW WR LQWHUYHQH
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other 
State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted 
threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural 
HOHPHQWVDUHLQYLRODWLRQRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶ 
10
 Nicaragua Case, para 202. 
11
 Robert Y. Jennings and Arthur D. Watts, 2SSHQKHLP¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ (9th edn, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 428; U.N. General Assembly, Consideration of Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Report of the Special Committee on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among 
States, 16 November 1964, 19th sess., UN Doc. A/5746, para 216; John Vincent, Non 
Intervention and International Order (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), 14. 
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embracing principle and can be dissected into more specific principles or rules that protect 
specific aspects of State sovereignty. The principle of non-intervention protects the integrity 
DQG DXWRQRP\ RI D 6WDWH¶V DXWKRULW\ DQG ZLOO LQ WKH VHQVH RI LWV FDSDFLW\ WR LQWHUQDO DQG
external self-governance.12 Understood in this way, the principle of non-intervention creates a 
juridical space where the government, as the holder of authority and will, can exercise freely 
its will and make free choices in view also of the fact that in international law the State is 
represented by the government. Because it protects an essential aspect of State sovereignty, 
the principle of non-intervention acquired independent legal status and it is critical in an 
international system defined by sovereignty and by interactions between sovereign States. Its 
alignment, however, with the principle of sovereignty has important normative and 
operational implications in that the scope and content of the principle of non-intervention is 
moulded by the meaning and content of the principle of sovereignty as developed in 
international law and relations.  
 
In order to define the content and meaning of the principle of non-intervention in 
international law, we need to explain the meaning of its opposite that is, intervention. 
According to 2SSHQKHLP¶VGHILQLWLRQ LQWHUYHQWLRQLV LQWHUIHUHQFHµIRUFLEOHRUGLFWDWRULDORU
otherwise coercive, in effect depriving the state intervened against of control over the matter 
LQTXHVWLRQ¶13 The ICJ in the Nicaragua case defined prohibited intervention aVµRQHEHDULQJ
on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide 
IUHHO\«DQGXVHVPHWKRGVRI FRHUFLRQ LQ UHJDUG WR VXFKFKRLFHVZKLFKPXVW UHPDLQ IUHH
RQHV¶14  From the above definitions, it transpires that in order for interference to constitute 
intervention, it should satisfy two conditions: first, it should impinge on matters that fall 
ZLWKLQD6WDWH¶VVRYHUHLJQaffairs and, secondly, it should be coercive.   
 
The first condition describes the domain within which interference should take place 
as well as the object of such interference. In this respect, the ICJ mentioned the choice of 
political, economic, social and cultural system and the formulation of foreign policy.15 It thus 
                                                          
12
 Nicaragua Case, para 202. 
13
 Jennings and Watts, 2SSHQKHLP¶V ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 3KLOLS.XQLJ ³3URKLELWLRQ RI
,QWHUYHQWLRQ´Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (2012) para 1. 
14
 Nicaragua Case, para 205. 
15
 Ibid. 
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transpires that the protected domain is D 6WDWH¶V political, economic, social and cultural 
system whereas the object of intervention is the ability to make free choices in this domain. 
That said, the aforementioned list is not exhaustive and can change in light of related 
developments concerning the meaning and scope of State sovereignty.16 As a result, the 
domain protected from intervention may expand or decrease, something that will affect the 
scope of the non-intervention principle.  
 
The second condition ± coercion ± refers to the nature of the interference and is what 
differentiates intervention from pure interference or influence. $VWKH,&-VDLGµWhe element 
RIFRHUFLRQ«GHILQHVDQGLQGHHGIRUPVWKHYHU\HVVHQFHRI>D@SURKLELWHGLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶17 
Traditionally, coercion in international law has been taken to imply compulsion whereby one 
State compels or attempts to compel another State to take a particular course of action against 
LWV ZLOO WKXV REWDLQLQJ LQ WKH ZRUGV RI WKH  )ULHQGO\ 5HODWLRQV 'HFODUDWLRQ µWKH
subordination RIWKHH[HUFLVHRILWVVRYHUHLJQULJKWV¶18   
 
Such a construction of intervention can very well apply to cyberspace. For instance, if 
D 6WDWH¶V JRYHUQPHQWDO VHUYLFHV DUH WDUJHWHG E\ D ''R6 DWWDFN LQ RUGHU WR FRPSHO LWV
government to change its policies or decisions, this would amount to prohibited intervention. 
The 2007 DDoS attacks against Estonia come immediately to mind. They were launched after 
the Estonian government decided to relocate a Soviet era statue, a decision that was resisted 
E\WKHFRXQWU\¶s Russian speaking minority and was frowned upon by Moscow. To the extent 
that they were intended to put such pressure on Estonia to change its decision and provided 
that they were attributed to Russia,19 in my opinion, they would constitute prohibited 
                                                          
16
 Jennings and Watts, 2SSHQKHLP¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ, 428. 
17
 Nicaragua Case, para 205.  
18
 U.N. General Assembly Res., 2625 (XXV) Friendly Relations Declaration (1970); See 
DOVR&KULVWRSKHU&-R\QHU³&RHUFLRQ´LQMax Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (2006)  µCoercion in inter-State relations involves the government of one State 
compelling the government of another State to think or act in a certain way by applying 
YDULRXVNLQGVRISUHVVXUHWKUHDWVLQWLPLGDWLRQRUWKHXVHRIIRUFH¶ 
19
 For attribution see: Nicholas Tsagourias³&\EHU$WWDFNV6HOI-Defence and the Problem of 
$WWULEXWLRQ´Journal of Conflict Security Law 17, no. 2 (2012): 229.  
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intervention.20 In contrast, the 2014 Sony attack21 does not amount to intervention because 
the target of the attack was a private company not connected to the US government and it did 
not involve a matter that falls within the sovereign prerogatives of the US nor was there any 
attempt to coerce the US government to take a particular course of action.  
    
 
III. Interference in The 2016 US Election and The Principle of Non-Intervention 
How would the above-PHQWLRQHGFRQVWUXFWLRQRILQWHUYHQWLRQDSSO\WR5XVVLD¶VLQterference 
in the 2016 US presidential election? Russian operations included hacking into the 
Democratic National Committee emails and the release of confidential information as well as 
disinformation operations.22 The former is referred to as doxing23 whose objective is to 
µexpose, disgrace, or otherwise undermine a particular individual, campaign, or organisation 
LQRUGHUWRLQIOXHQFHSXEOLFRSLQLRQGXULQJDQHOHFWLRQF\FOH¶24 whereas disinformation is the 
dissemination of µIDOVH LQDFFXUDWH RU PLVOHDGLQJ information designed, presented and 
SURPRWHG WR LQWHQWLRQDOO\FDXVHSXEOLFKDUPRU IRUSURILW¶DQGFDQ WKUHDWHQ WKHµGHPRFUDWLF
SROLWLFDOSURFHVVHVDQGYDOXH¶25 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office 
                                                          
20
 1LFKRODV7VDJRXULDV³7KH7DOOLQQ0DQXDORQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ$SSOLFDEOHWR&\EHU
Warfare: A Commentary on Chapter II ± The Use oI )RUFH´ Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law 15 (2012): 19±43, 35; 5XVVHOO%XFKDQ³&\EHU$WWDFNV8QODZIXO8VHVRI
)RUFH RU 3URKLELWHG ,QWHUYHQWLRQV"´ Journal of 
Conflict & Security Law 17, no. 2 (2012): 212-227.  
21
 .LP=HWWHU³Sony Got Hacked HarG:KDW:H.QRZDQG'RQ
W.QRZ6R)DU´Wired, 12 
March 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know/.  
22
 See ODNI Report 2-5. 
23
 6HH ,GR.LORYDW\ µ'R[IDUH: Politically Motivated Leaks and the Future of the Norm on 
1RQ ,QWHUYHQWLRQ LQ WKH (UD RI :HDSRQL]HG ,QIRUPDWLRQ¶ +DUY 1DW¶O 6HF 
J. 9 (2018):146, 152..  
24
 EU vs Disinfo, ³0HWKRGV RI )RUHLJQ (OHFWRUDO ,QWHUIHUHQFH´  $SULO 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/methods-of-foreign-electoral-interference/.  
25
 European Commission, A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Disinformation: Report of the 
Independent High Level Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation, 2018, 
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of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) issued a joint statement claiming that the 
Russian government was responsible for the hack and the publication of the materials in an 
DWWHPSWWRµLQWHUIHUHZLWKWKH86HOHFWLRQSURFHVV¶26 and, according to ODNI, the intention of 
the leaks was to µundermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary 
&OLQWRQ DQG KDUP KHU HOHFWDELOLW\ DQG SRWHQWLDO SUHVLGHQF\¶27 Following investigations, a 
number of Russian operatives were indicted. According to the 0XHOOHU LQGLFWPHQW µ[t]he 
conspiracy had as its object impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful governmental 
functions of the United States by dishonest means in order to enable the Defendants to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Publications Office of the European Union), p. 10.  According to EU vs Disinfo, 
GLVLQIRUPDWLRQLVµWKHIDEULFDWLRQRUGHOLEHUDWHGLVWRUWLRQRIQHZVFRQWHQWDLPHGDWGHFHLYLQJ
an audience, polluting the information space to obscure fact-based reality, and manufacturing 
misleading narratives about key events or issues to manipulate public opinion. 
'LVLQIRUPDWLRQ LV WKH PRVW SHUVLVWHQW DQG ZLGHVSUHDG IRUP RI WKH .UHPOLQ¶V LQWHUIHUHQFH
efforts. Importantly, it is not limited only to election cycles, but has now become a viral 
IHDWXUHRIRXULQIRUPDWLRQHFRV\VWHP¶DQGLWVREMHFWLYHLVµWRSDUDO\VHWKHGHPRFUDWLFSURFHVV
by fuelling social fragmentation and polarisation, sowing confusion and uncertainty about 
fact-based reality, and undermining trust in the integrity of democratic politics and 
LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ EU vs Disinfo, ³0HWKRGV RI )RUHLJQ (OHFWRUDO ,QWHUIHUHQFH´  $SULO  
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/methods-of-foreign-electoral-interference/. Others speak of 
³LQIRUPDWLRQ PDQLSXODWLRQ´ HQFRPSDVVLQJ WKUHH FULWHULD D FRRUGLQDWHG FDPSDLJQ WKH
diffusion of false information or information that is consciously distorted, and the political 
LQWHQWLRQ WR FDXVH KDUP¶ 6HH -HDQ-Baptise Jeangène Vilmer, Alexandre Escorcia, Marine 
*XLOODXPH-DQDLQD+HUUHUD³Information Manipulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies, 
Report by the Policy Planning Staff (CAPS) of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs 
DQG WKH ,QVWLWXWH IRU 6WUDWHJLF 5HVHDUFK ,56(0 RI WKH 0LQLVWU\ IRU WKH $UPHG )RUFHV´
(Paris, August 2018), 21.  
26
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
³-RLQW6WDWHPHQW IURP WKH'HSDUWPHQWRI+RPHODQG6HFXULW\ DQG2IILFHRI WKH'LUHFWRURI
1DWLRQDO ,QWHOOLJHQFH RQ (OHFWLRQ 6HFXULW\´  2FWREHU  '+6 3UHVV 2IILFH), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-department-homeland-security-and-
office-director-national  
27
 ODNI Report 2017, supra note 5.  
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interfere with U.S. political and electoral processes, including the 2016 U.S. presidential 
HOHFWLRQ¶28 
 
2QH FDQ SODXVLEO\ VD\ WKDW5XVVLD¶V DFWLRQV VDWLVILHG WKH ILUVW FRQGLWLRQRI XQODZIXO
intervention by targeting the conduct of elections. As the ICJ opined in the Nicaragua case, 
WKH µFKRLFH RI SROLWLFDO V\VWHP¶ LV D PDWWHU IDOOLQJ ZLWKLQ D 6WDWH¶V VRYHUHLJQ SUHURJDWLYHV
ZKLFK VKRXOG UHPDLQ µIUHH IURP H[WHUQDO LQWHUYHQWLRQ¶29 and went on to say that holding 
elections is a domestic matter.30 There are problems, however, with the second condition 
QDPHO\ WKDW RI FRHUFLRQ $FFRUGLQJ WR %ULDQ (JDQ µD F\EHU RSHUDWLRQ E\ D 6WDWH WKDW
LQWHUIHUHVZLWKDQRWKHU6WDWH¶VDELOLW\WRKROGDQHOHFWLRQRUWKDWPDQLSXODWHVD6WDWH¶VHOHFWLRQ
results would be a clear violation of the rule of non-LQWHUYHQWLRQ¶31 Likewise, according to 
WKHIRUPHU8.$WWRUQH\*HQHUDOµWKHXVHE\DKRVWLOHVWDWHRIF\EHURSHUDWLRQVWRPDQLSXODWH
WKH HOHFWRUDO V\VWHP WR DOWHU WKH UHVXOWV RI DQ HOHFWLRQ LQ DQRWKHU VWDWH«PXVW VXUHO\ EH D
breach of the prohibition on LQWHUYHQWLRQLQWKHGRPHVWLFDIIDLUVRIVWDWHV¶32 These statements 
refer to interference with the electoral administration, for example, interference with electoral 
UHJLVWHUV WRGHOHWHYRWHUV¶QDPHVDVZHOODVRQLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKWKHHOHFWRUDO LQIUDVWUXFture, 
for example, interference with the recording or counting of votes or the blocking of voting 
PDFKLQHV FDQFHOOLQJ WKXV DQ HOHFWLRQ 6LQFH 5XVVLD¶V RSHUDWLRQV DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH
aforementioned reports,33 did not amount to such interference, they do not breach the non- 
intervention norm.  
                                                          
28
 U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC 
et al (Indictment, 16 February 2018), Criminal Action No. 100032 (DLF), para 25 and United 
States v. Victor Borisovich Netyksho et al (Indictment, 13 July 2018), Criminal Action No. 
00215 (ABJ), para. 28 (The Mueller Indictments), 
https://d3i6fh83elv35t.cloudfront.net/static/2018/07/Muellerindictment.pdf.  
29
 Nicaragua Case, para 205. 
30
 Nicaragua Case, paras 257-9. 
31
 %ULDQ - (JDQ ³,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ DQG 6WDELOLW\ LQ &\EHUVSDFH´ %HUNHOH\ - ,QW¶O / 35 
(2017): 169, 175. 
32
 U..$WWRUQH\*HQHUDO¶V2IILFHCyber and International Law in the 21st Century, 23 May 
2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-
century 
33
 ODNI Report 2017, supra n 5, 3. 
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That said, many States since then have designated their electoral infrastructure 
(registration, casting and counting votes, submitting and tallying results) as critical national 
infrastructure.34 In the same vein, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace 
(GCSC) proposed a norm prohibiting the disruption of elections through cyber-attacks on the 
technical infrastructure that supports elections.35 Although these are important developments, 
they only address one aspect of the phenomenon of electoral cyber interference that is, 
meddling with the electoral infrastructure but do not extend to the process according to which 
the will of the people is formed and how intervention can impact on them. Yet, outcomes can 
be affected not only by interfering with the electoral infrastructure but also by interfering 
with the process of will formation. This is an issue that will be discussed in the next section.  
 
IV. Contextualising and Reconceptualising Intervention in Cyberspace 
In this section, I revisit the phenomenon of intervention in order to contextualise and 
reconceptualise the principle of non-intervention for cyber purposes. This is necessary for 
                                                          
34
 U.S. Department of Homeland 6HFXULW\ ³(OHFWLRQ 6HFXULW\´, 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/election-security.  
35
 Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, ³*OREDO&RPPLVVLRQ8UJHV3URWHFWLQJ
(OHFWRUDO ,QIUDVWUXFWXUH´, 24 May 2018, https://cyberstability.org/research/global-
commission-urges-protecting-electoral-infrastructure/; See also: U.K. Cabinet Office, 
National Security Capability Review, 28 March 2018, 34 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf; For Sweden see: Government 
2IILFHVRI6ZHGHQ0LQLVWU\RI-XVWLFH³1DWLRQDO6WUDWHJ\IRU6RFLHW\,QIRUPDWLRQDQG&\EHU
6HFXULW\´, June 2018, 6-7 
https://www.government.se/4ac8ff/contentassets/d87287e088834d9e8c08f28d0b9dda5b/a-
national-cyber-security-strategy-skr.-201617213; Sean Kanuck, Global Commission on the 
6WDELOLW\RI&\EHUVSDFH³Protecting the Electoral Process and its Institutions´, January 2018, 
https://cyberstability.org/research/.  
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many reasons. In the first place and, as was said earlier, cyberspace is a new domain but one 
that is embedded in the political and legal environment where States operate. States thus use 
cyberspace as a conduit of power and indeed as a conduit of intervention by employing not 
only the traditional diplomatic, political, military, or economic tools of coercion but also new 
tools suitable to cyberspace. Second, because of the particular features of cyberspace such as 
its interconnectedness and anonymity, the pathways of coercion can diversify whereas the 
scalability, reach and effects of intervention enhanced.36 Third, the very nature of the concept 
of intervention invites such reassessment. Intervention is not a static concept but a concept 
that is constantly contextualised in time or domain and whose meaning, scope and practice 
changes accordingly. What intervention signified in the nineteenth century is not the same 
today, neither is the meaning of military, diplomatic, political or legal intervention. It is for 
these reasons that the concept of intervention needs to be contextualised and reconceptualised 
for cyber purposes and in what follows I will do this by first explaining the intimate 
relationship between non-intervention and self-determination, hence repositioning the domain 
and object of intervention and, secondly, by reassessing the baseline of coercion and by 
explaining the pathways coercion can take in cyberspace and how they impact on self-
determination and consequently on the principle of non-intervention.  
 
IV.i Non-Intervention and Self-Determination  
With regard to the first issue, it was said in Section I that intervention acquires meaning 
within a configuration of sovereign relations by protecting the integrity and autonomy of a 
6WDWH¶V DXWKRULW\ DQGZLOO DJDLQVW H[WHUQDO LQWHUIHUHQFH$VZDV DOVR H[plained, the domain 
SURWHFWHGIURPLQWHUYHQWLRQFRQVLVWVRIWKH6WDWH¶VVRYHUHLJQSUHURJDWLYHVZKHUHDVWKHREMHFW
of intervention is the ability to make free choices on these matters. This traditional reading of 
intervention focuses on the internal and/or external manifestation of authority and will by the 
State represented by the government; it vests in other words all sovereign authority and will 
in the government which is then protected from intervention but does not take into account 
how this authority and will are formed and how intervention can impact on the process of 
their formation. Instead, it treats the State and its government as if they were cut off from the 
prior process of authority and will formation. However, that process of authority and will 
formation is connected with the internal and external manifestation of such authority and will 
                                                          
36
 )RUH[DPSOHWKH2'1,5HSRUWVXSUDQRWHVD\VWKDW5XVVLD¶VDFWLRQVµUHSUHVHQWHGD
VLJQLILFDQWHVFDODWLRQLQGLUHFWQHVVOHYHORIDFWLYLW\DQGVFRSHRIHIIRUW¶ 
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E\WKHJRYHUQPHQW7RH[SODLQDJRYHUQPHQW¶VDXWKRULW\DQGZLOOUHPDLQVIUHHRQO\ZKHQLWV
sourcing is also free. This immediately brings to light the relationship between non-
intervention and self-determination,37 another principle that derives from and protects the 
principle of State sovereignty. Self-determination refers to the right of peoples to determine 
freely and without external interference their political status and to pursue freely their 
economic, social and cultural development.38  
From this definition, it transpires that the scope of the right to self-determination is 
broader and is not exclusively linked to the right of peoples to form their own State. 
Moreover it does not cease once a State has been created but thereafter self-determination 
refers to the µULJKWWRDXWKHQWLFVHOI-government, that is, the right of a people really and freely 
WRFKRRVHLWVRZQSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFUHJLPH¶39 It follows from this that the principle of 
non-intervention protects against external interference the expression of authority and will by 
the people and also protects the conditions that enable the people to form authority and will 
freely and make free choices.40 External interference through disinformation combined with 
                                                          
37
 -HQV 'DYLG 2KOLQ ³Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate 
InteUQDWLRQDO/DZ"´Tex. L. Rev. 95 (2016): 1579; U.N. General Assembly, Consideration of 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Report of the Special 
Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation Among States, 16 November 1964, 19th sess., U.N. Doc. A/5746, para 216. 
38
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (concluded 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, Article 1(1); U.N. General Assembly 
Res., 2625 (XXV) Friendly Relations Declaration (1970). 
39
 Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 137; Patrick Thornberry, "The Democratic or Internal 
Aspect of Self-Determination with Some Remarks on Federalism" in Modern Law of Self-
Determination, edited by Christian Tomuschat (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1992), 101. 
40
 $FFRUGLQJ WR 8QLYHUVDO 'HFODUDWLRQ RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV $UWLFOH  µ>W@KH ZLOO RI WKH
people shall be the basis of the authority of government. See: U.N. General Assembly Res., 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 183rd Plenary Meeting, U.N. 
Doc. 217A (III). 
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identity falsification, for example,41 distorts, undermines or inverses this process and nullifies 
the genuine expression of authority and will by the people. It also taints the internal or 
external manifestation or expression of authority and will by the government that emerges. 
)RUWKLVUHDVRQLQWKHZRUGVRI&UDZIRUGµWKHSULQFLSOHRIVHOI-determination is represented 
E\WKHUXOHDJDLQVWLQWHUYHQWLRQLQWKHLQWHUQDODIIDLUVRIWKDWVWDWH¶42  
By aligning the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, the normative 
and operational scope of the principle of non-intervention shifts. More specifically, the 
domain and object of intervention shifts from the government, to the actual power holder, the 
people, and to the process of forming authority and willthrough which the goal of free choice 
is also attained. Whereas the government as the depository of such authority and will is 
protected by the principle of non-intervention,  it is not the primary object of protection as the 
traditional reading holds, but a derivative one; the primary object of protection are the people 
and the process of authority and will formation. 
IV.ii Control As The Baseline of Coercion and The Pathways of Coercion    
Having identified the domain and object of protection by the principle of non-intervention, I 
will now consider its  second element, that of coercion.  In international law, there has been 
little consideration of the threshold or the baseline of coercion above which intervention takes 
SODFH2SSHQKHLP¶VGHILQLWLRQ LVKRZHYHUTXLWH LQVWUXFWLYH$FFRUGLQJ WRKLP WKHHVVHQFH
of coercion is the fact that a State intervened against is, in effect, deprived of control over a 
PDWWHU &RQWURO PHDQV RQH 6WDWH¶V intentional direction over DQRWKHU 6WDWH¶V DXWKRULW\ DQG
will, which prevents the latter from discharging its authority and will freely and making free 
choices.  When a State assumes control over a matter at the expense of the State which has a 
legitimate claim of authority and will over that matter because it falls within its sovereign 
SUHURJDWLYHV LW HIIHFWLYHO\ FXUWDLOV WKH ODWWHU¶V FDSDFLW\ to self-determination as self-
governance, which, as was said, are protected by the principle of non-intervention. It inverses 
                                                          
41
 -HQV'DYLG2KOLQ³(OHFWLRQ,QWHUIHUHQFH7KH5HDO+DUPDQG7KH2QO\6ROXWLRQ´Cornell 
Law School Research Paper, no. 18-50 (2018): 1-26, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3276940.  
42
 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 127. 
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these values by forcing the State to act counterintuitively to what its free authority and will 
would advocate.43  
 
Regarding the pathways to coercion, or the means and methods through which 
FRHUFLRQ FDQ EH DFWXDOLVHG WKH ,&- VSRNH RI µPHWKRGV¶ RI FRHUFLRQ LQ WKH SOXUDO DQG DOVR
spoke of direct and indirect methods. This means that there is a spectrum of coercion which 
can manifest itself through various means and methods. In the first place, coercion, as 
Oppenheim noted, can be forcible. In the Nicaragua case the ICJ said that one of the most 
obvious forms of coercion is the one that uses force either in the direct form of military action 
or in the indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another 
State.44 In this case, the intervened against State loses control over a matter, for example over 
parts of its territory, through the use of armed force. Forcible coercion is direct and perhaps 
the most dramatic and serious form of coercion and, for this reason, it acquired its own legal 
meaning and status in the rule prohibiting the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter and in customary law.  
 
Another pathway to coercion mentioned by Oppenheim is that of dictatorial 
interference. Dictatorial interference is when a State prescribes a course of action in 
imperative terms and usually by threatening negative consequences, forcing thus the will of 
the recipient State. This is again a direct form of coercion and describes a situation where two 
VRYHUHLJQ µZLOOV¶ FODVK RYHU D PDWWHU DQG RQH 6WDWH ORVHV FRQWURO RYHU D PDWWHU E\
subordinating its will.    
 
In addition to these direct pathways, there are also other more subtle or indirect 
pathways to coercion where one State extends its will over another and thus assumes control 
even if the latter State appears to behave freely. This can happen when the intervening State 
DUUDQJHV WKH WDUJHWHG6WDWH¶VFKRLFHV LQVXFKDZay that it has no effective choice. Another 
instance is when WKHLQWHUYHQRUWKURXJKPDQLSXODWLRQDUUDQJHVWKHRWKHU6WDWH¶VSUHIHUHQFHV
LQ VXFK DZD\ WKDW WKH 6WDWH DFWV LQ DFFRUGDQFHZLWK WKH LQWHUYHQRU¶V SUHIHUUHG FKRLFHV ,Q
                                                          
43
 Rosenau, for example, speaks about a sharp break with conventional patterns of behaviour, 
see: -DPHV15RVHQDXµ,QWHUYHQWLRQDVD6FLHQWLILF&RQFHSW¶Journal of Conflict Resolution 
13, no. 2 (1969): 149-171, 162-3. 
44
 Nicaragua Case, para 205. 
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these cases, coercion as control does not appear to be conflictual since the victim State 
apparently acts voluntarily but the intervenor exerts control over the other and extends its will 
by rearranging the available choices or by rearranging preferences to align them with its own. 
)RU H[DPSOH LI D 6WDWH DVVXPHV FRQWURO RYHU DQRWKHU 6WDWH¶V JRYHUQPHQWDO V\VWHPV RU
systems supporting critical national infrastructure) and manipulates their operation, this 
would amount to coercion to the extent that the systems operate counterintuitively to how 
they were programmed to operate by the victim State and produce actions and effects desired 
by the intervener. Also, when a State, through cyber espionage, acquires information on 
DQRWKHU6WDWH¶VSROLFLHVZKLFKLVWKHQXVHGWRGLUHFt the choices of the victim State, it controls 
WKHODWWHU¶VFKRLFHVDJDLQVWLWVZLVKHV45 
 
IV.iii Electoral Cyber Interference and Intervention  
:KHUHFRHUFLRQDVFRQWUROFDQPDQLIHVW LWVHOIPRUHDFXWHO\ LVZKHQD6WDWH¶VDXWKRULW\ DQG
will are manipulated at its source; in the process of their formation. To explain, when a State 
interferes with the structures and the environment that condition and facilitate the formation 
of authority and will by the people, and substitutes the legitimate process of self-
determination with an artificially constructed process in order to generate particular attitudes 
and results to serve its particular interests,46 the intervening State controls not only the 
                                                          
45
 For cyber espionage, see also: Russell Buchan, Cyber Espionage and International Law 
(Hart, 2018), 48-69.  
46
 According to Rosenau LQWHUYHQWLRQ LV DGGUHVVHG WR µWKH DXWKRULW\ VWUXFWXUH RI WKH WDUJHW
society-that is, to the identity of those who make the decisions that are binding for the entire 
society and/or to the processes through which such decisions are made. New foreign policy 
initiatives designed to modify the behavior of voters abroad are thus likely to be regarded as 
interventionary even though equally extensive efforts to modify the behavior of tourists in the 
VDPHFRXQWU\DUHQRW¶-DPHV15RVHQDX³,QWHUYHQWLRQDVD6FLHQWLILF&RQFHSW´Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 13, no. 2 (1969): 149-171, 163; Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. 
)HOLFLDQR ³,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RHUFLRQ DQG:RUOG 3XEOLF 2UGHU 7KH*HQHUDO 3ULQFLSOHV RI WKH
/DZRI:DU´Yale LJ ³7KHXVHRf the ideological instrument commonly 
involves the selective manipulation and circulation of symbols, verbal or nonverbal, 
calculated to alter the patterns of identifications, demands and expectations of mass audiences 
in the target-state and thereby to induce or stimulate politically significant attitudes and 
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attitudes, will and choices of the people, but also the will of the government that emerges. 
Consequently, the right to self-determination as self-governance which is protected by the 
non-intervention principle is essentially curtailed. Take for example the case of deep fakes 
when, during an electoral campaign, imageries, voices or videos of politicians are simulated 
in order to discredit them. To the extent that such operations are designed and executed in 
such a way as to manipulate the cognitive process where authority and will are formed and to 
WDNHFRQWURORYHUSHRSOHV¶ choices of government, they would constitute intervention. 
 
As the aforementioned example shows, cyberspace provides a facilitative ecosystem 
where electoral interference can take place and as was said, it can also enhance its scalability, 
reach and effects of coercion. To explain, cyberspace has made it easier to produce, 
disseminate and share disinformation, enhances its accessibility by amplifying the circle of 
targeted audiences or by micro-targeting, increases the immediacy and speed of such 
operations, complicates attribution and allows for remotely conducted operations. 
 
The interference in the 2016 US elections is a case in point. As was said, Russian 
operations included the hacking and release of confidential information and social-media 
enabled disinformation. The primary target of such operations was the cognitive environment 
which enables the making of choices which are subsequently reflected in the type of 
government that emerges from the process.47 As James Comey, the former FBI director, said 
before the Senate Intelligence Committee: µ>W@KLV LV VXFK D ELJ GHDO«ZH KDYH WKLV ELJ
PHVV\ZRQGHUIXOFRXQWU\ZKHUH«QRERG\WHOOVXVZKDWWRWKLQNZKDWWRILJKWDERXWZKDW
WRYRWHIRUH[FHSWRWKHU$PHULFDQV «%XWZH¶UH talking about a foreign government that, 
using technical intrusion, lots of other methods, tried to shape the way we think, we vote, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
behavior favorable to the initiator-VWDWH´&RQWUDVHH'XQFDQ+ROOLV³7KH,QIOXHQFHRI:DU
7KH :DU IRU ,QIOXHQFH´ Temp.  
,QW¶O	&RPS/- 32 (2018): 31, 41. 
47
 'XQFDQ+ROOLV³7KH,QIOXHQFHRI:DU 7KH:DUIRU,QIOXHQFH´7HPS,QW¶O	&RPS/-32 
(2018): 31, 36; Herbert Lin and Jaclyn 
Kerr, ³2Q &\EHU-(QDEOHG ,QIRUPDWLRQ,QIOXHQFH :DUIDUH DQG 0DQLSXODWLRQ´ (2017) 
https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/cyber-enabled_influence_warfare-
ssrn-v1.pdf.  
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DFW¶48 ,QDVLPLODUYHLQWKH861DWLRQDO6HFXULW\6WUDWHJ\RSLQHGWKDWµ[a] democracy is 
only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental 
UHTXLUHPHQW IRU D IUHH DQG UHVLOLHQW QDWLRQ « 7RGD\ DFWRUV VXFK DV 5XVVLD DUH XVLQJ
information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries 
target media, politicDOSURFHVVHVILQDQFLDOQHWZRUNVDQGSHUVRQDOGDWD¶ 49  
 
)URP WKHSUHFHGLQJGLVFXVVLRQ LW FDQEHVDLG WKDW5XVVLD¶V LQWHUIHUHQFHPHW WKH WZR
conditions of unlawful intervention. Although one could have stopped here, it is important to 
consider a number of other issues which should be present although their status has not been 
firmly settled in legal doctrine.  
The first is intention and more specifically whether coercion should be intentional. 
The Tallinn Manual treats intent as a constitutive element of the principle of non-
intervention,50 but there are also dissenting voices who treat intervention as an objective state 
of affairs.51 If, as was said previously, intervention is relational and contextual, it can never 
be an objective state of affairs. It seems that the ICJ in the Nicaragua case required intent 
ZKHQ LW VDLG WKDW µin international law, if one State, with a view to the coercion of another 
State, supports and assists armed bands in that State whose purpose is to overthrow the 
government of that State, that amounts to an intervention by the one State in the internal 
affairs of the other, whether or not the political objective of the State giving such support and 
assistance is equally far-UHDFKLQJ¶52 What the Court meant is that a State should have the 
                                                          
48
 )XOO7UDQVFULSWDQG9LGHR-DPHV&RPH\¶V7HVWLPRQ\RQ&DSLWRO+LOO, New York Times, 8 
June 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/08/us/politics/senate-hearing-transcript.html.  
49
 U.S., The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
December 2017, (Washington D.C.), p. 14 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.  
50
 Michael N. Schmitt (ed) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Operations (2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) (hereinafter Tallinn 
Manual 2.0), Rule 66, para 27. 
51
 See: Sean Watts, Low-Intensity Cyber Operations and the Principle of Non-Intervention, in 
Cyber War: Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts, edited by Jens David Ohlin, Kevin Govern 
and Claire Finkelstein, (OUP, 2015), 249, 268-9. 
52
 Nicaragua Case, para 241. 
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intention to coerce another State by using proxies although it may not share the particular 
objective of the proxies it is supporting.  
In the opinion of the present writer, intent is critical, particularly in cyberspace, 
where operations are often factually indistinguishable and their effects permeate borders 
unintentionally. Moreover, intent distinguishes influence operations or in general propaganda 
from operations that are purposively designed to exert control over a sovereign matter (self-
determination) through false, fabricated, misleading, or generally through disinformation.  
That having been said, it should be acknowledged that it is difficult to establish intent. 
There may exist some factual and demonstrable evidence to prove intent in the form of 
statements or the involvement of State operatives,53 otherwise intent can be constructed from 
circumstantial evidence and from surrounding circumstances. For example, the target of the 
operation 54 and the means used (disinformation) are important indicators. With regard to the 
latter, one can look into whether the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information 
has been breached.55 For example in the case of deep fakes or leaked email it is the 
authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of the disseminated information that is breached but 
even in the case of true information, it is its integrity and authenticity that is encroached if it 
is mixed with false information or is presented in a false or fabricated context or if it relates 
to partial truths. Other factors to take into account to establish intent are the political and 
ideological competition that exists between States, the strategic or other interests served by 
the operation, the timing of the operation, the intensity and widespread nature of the 
operation. With regard to the latter, the Mueller indictment demonstrated the widespread and 
systematic nature RI5XVVLD¶VLQWHUIHUHQFH 56  
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 See, for example, the ODNI Report 2017, supra note 5, and the Mueller Indictments, supra 
n. 28.  
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 According to the ODNI Report 2017, the target was the Democratic candidate. Also, 
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The second condition is that of knowledge in the sense of whether the victim State 
should be aware of the coercion. Certain commentators contend that knowledge is not 
required whereas  others claim that it is required because a State cannot be coerced when it is 
unaware of the act of coercion.57 In international relations theory, which views coercion as an 
instrument of power and usually identifies it with threats, knowledge of the threat and of its 
author is important because it relates to the persuasiveness and credibility of the threat. For 
this reason, some international relations commentators view cyber coercion as 
inconsequential because of the covert nature of cyber operations.58  
 
The difference, however, between international law and international relations is that 
the latter takes a functional approach to intervention whereas international law takes a 
normative approach. It is thus submitted that knowledge is not a constitutive element of 
intervention but knowledge is required in order to trigger a claim that intervention has taken 
place. This also means that the fact that intervention may be covert, or that it was attempted 
without actually succeeding, will not affect the qualification of the impugned behaviour as 
intervention for international law purposes when the intervened against State becomes aware 
of the situation, provided of course that the criteria of intervention have been satisfied. To put 
it differently, the intervening State cannot claim that there was no intervention or that there is 
no breach of the non-intervention rule because at the time intervention happened the victim 
State was not aware of the intervention. This also means that the victim State is not prevented 
from taking countermeasures after acquiring knowledge of the intervention even if the act of 
intervention occurred much earlier because there will be temporal proximity between the 
countermeasures and the claim of wrongfulness. In the US case, the fact that subsequent 
reports established the facts will not prevent the US from claiming that it was victim of 
unlawful intervention although whether it will do so is a matter of politics.    
 
Finally, such interference needs to reach a certain level of severity to amount to 
intervention. Severity can be assessed against the importance of the values affected which in 
this case is the value of self-determination; the consequences of intervention which in this 
                                                          
57
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case LVWKHFRQWURORID6WDWH¶VDXWKRULW\and will and, according to McDougal and Feliciano, 
the extent to which values are affected and the number of participants whose values are so 
affected.59 Although no analytical tool exists to measure the real impact of electoral 
interference on people or how their voting preferences were affected, however analysis of 
social networks can reveal the number of viewers or artificial movements and to some extent 
measure the number of affected individuals.60 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that cyberspace is a new domain where the principle of non-
intervention can apply. However, deciphering its content and understanding how it applies to 
cyberspace is a difficult exercise that can impact on its effectiveness to regulate cyber 
activities. Consequently, reassessing the meaning of intervention in the cyber domain is 
critical because cyberspace is a domain where States compete and exert power and it is an 
environment which increases the scalability, reach and effects of intervention. 
 
For this reason, in this chapter I contextualised and reassessed the principle of non-
intervention for cyber purposes. More specifically, I aligned the principle of non-intervention 
with that of self-determination and argued that non-intervention protects not just the integrity 
and autonomy RI D6WDWH¶VDXWKRULW\ DQGZLOO DV LWPDQLIHVWV LWVHOI LQWHUQDOO\ DQGH[WHUQDOO\
through the government, but primarily it protects its source, the people, and the process 
according to which authority and will are formed. I then identified the baseline of coercion as 
FRQWURO RYHU D PDWWHU WKDW IDOOV ZLWKLQ D 6WDWH¶V VRYHUHLJQ SUHURJDWLYHV DQG DSSOLHG WKLV
definition to cyberspace by looking into the different ways control and, therefore, coercion 
manifests itself. In relation to electoral interference, it manifests itself as control over the 
conditions that enable the exercise of self-determination by the people in the sense of freely 
forming authority and will which subsequently extends to control over the manifestation and 
expression of such authority and will by the government.  
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By reassessing what the principle of non-intervention entails in the cyber era, 
international law will be able to fill many normative and operational gaps that currently exist 
when it is called upon to apply to cyber operations. The implications of such 
reconceptualization are not limited to cyber intervention but extend to the concept of 
intervention in general which, as was said, is a dynamic concept that requires constant re-
evaluation. However, it should be admitted that this is not the end of the road because it is for 
States to take up the mantle and provide normative and operational clarity as to the meaning 
of intervention in cyberspace and, more broadly, in the physical world. Yet, even if 
agreement on the meaning of cyber intervention is attained, intervention will still be a 
controversial concept because there is disagreement as to which interventions are lawful or 
unlawful but justified. For example, is electoral cyber interference in democracies unlawful 
whereas a cyber campaign to overthrow a dictatorial regime lawful or at least justified? To 
the extent that these issues have not been settled in international law, intervention and non-
intervention will remain a Jekyll and Hyde concept even in the cyber context. That having 
been said, this is a second order enquiry because the first order enquiry is ontological; it is 
about the meaning of intervention to which this chapter attempted to provide an answer.  
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